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PANEL DISCUSSION II
PROFESSOR MEADOR: I will make just two or three
quick observations. Unlike the appellate process we discussed
previously, in this area there is a great deal that the judges and
the courts can do themselves. Much more can be accomplished
through rule making power, imaginative actions by judges, and
the suggestions of which Judge Motley spoke.1
In diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, we have an immense
untapped potential for dealing with a lot of the problems that
Dean Cooper talked about. Congress can expand that potential
enormously by permitting nationwide service of process and the
joining of claims and parties that cannot be brought together
today in any one forum. The present configuration of diversity
jurisdiction is, in my view, dysfunctional. It brings a lot of cases
into the federal courts that ought not be there, but does not permit many that could usefully be litigated there to come in. In
1968 the American Law Institute Study (ALI Study) moved in
that direction,2 but I think we could move much further. I hope
that the new ALI study on complex litigation 3 might accomplish
that and come up with some good proposals, while at the same
time getting rid of a lot of the diversity jurisdiction that should
not be in the federal courts.
Another approach that would do much good, I think, is to
think imaginatively about the use of multidistrict panels. The
jurisdictional statutes ought to be amended to allow transfer and
consolidation for all purposes, not simply for pretrial purposes. I
think you can have a national "switching station" in the multidistrict panel through which litigation from throughout the
country arising out of a common transaction can be brought together. I think we ought to move in that direction. Judge Keeton's imaginative thrust into the future at the end of his re-

1. See Motley, supra pp. 546-49.
2. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969) (completed in 1968) [hereinafter ALI STUDY].
3. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMPLEx LITIGATION: REPORT
(Feb. 19, 1987).
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marks 4 brings up another problem that we must think about,
and that is whether many of these mass matters ought to be
taken out of the courts altogether because they simply are unfit
for judicial resolution. I think we will get to that situation with
the Agent Orange type of case. These enormous and sprawling
matters simply do not lend themselves very readily to adjudication, at least in the sense we have always thought of it, and I
expect we will be moving out of this situation.
Along a similar vein, it seems to me that personal injury
matters have eventually got to be taken out of the court. There
is, in my view, very little that can be said in defense of the present system of compensating persons who are injured. I think we
will see movement along that line, but it may be slow and long
in coming. These are some of the mixtures of prophecy and
wishful thinking I offer on the subject.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: The American Law Institute is
making at least tentative steps in two directions of the sort that
Professor Meador talked about. There is one project that has
been approved, although it has not yet been funded, with Professor Richard Stewart of the Harvard Law School as Reporter,
to study the substantive aspects of compensation for tort. A separate project, only in the preliminary stages, is a study to see if a
full-scale project on complex litigation seems worthwhile, with
Professor Arthur Miller as Reporter and Dean Cooper as one of
the advisers. Professor Cooper, could you tell us what that project is?
DEAN COOPER: The Advisory Committee is meeting with
the purpose of discussing a draft proposal for a study across a
wide variety of topics. The topics that are currently under discussion divide things in much the way I did in my paper. The
problems of complex litigation in terms of case management,
discovery, pretrial management, and actual trial have been put
aside, at least for the moment. The focus is much more on questions of choice of law, jurisdiction, and devices for consolidation
in what we would think of today as a transjurisdictional sense.
My guess is that since the draft proposals are very well done,
they will decide to go further.
Let me discuss an area touched upon in many places in my
4. See Keeton, supra pp. 540-43.
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paper. This area is not completely outside my competence, but
certainly is outside any area in which I have thought very much
for very long. This is the choice of law question. It has been an
accepted doctrine for more than forty-five years that, in diversity cases, a federal court is bound by the choice of law rules
applied by the courts of the state in which that federal court is
sitting. This doctrine has proliferated to the rule that when a
case is transferred from one federal district court to a federal
district court in another state, the transferee court must take
with the case the choice of law rules applied by the court of the
state in which the action was filed. Many of the questions that
arise from mass litigation suggest that federal courts should be
cut loose from that doctrine. Whether diversity jurisdiction is
the mechanism for bringing more mass litigation into federal
courts, whether we develop an interpleader model, class action
model, or whatever, I have never been able to understand the
rule in Klaxon v. Stentor.5 It seems clear that there is much to
be said for abolishing the Klaxon rule in the simple lawsuit, but
the case becomes almost overwhelming in the complex lawsuit. I
would like someone to explain to me why that is not so.
JUDGE KEETON: I will attempt an answer of why it is not
an operable rule. At least fifteen to twenty percent of the cases
on my docket plainly have choice of law issues in them. But it is
a very, very rare case in which I have to decide one of those
issues. When I say to the lawyers, "If you want me to think
about the choice of law question, I will ask you to tell me first
why it makes any difference," the lawyers usually tell me, "Well,
on this issue, there is no decision in either of those jurisdictions
on this question." Thus, to make the choice of law question relevant, what I have to do is first predict that the two courts that
have not yet decided this issue will decide it differently. Now,
why should I do that? As a practical matter among trial lawyers
and trial judges, we usually find some way of dealing with the
controversy without addressing that question. Therefore, although I have not really answered your question, Dean Cooper, I
think that choice of law rules generally may be the classic illustration of the rule so refined that we come to think about the
rule in an abstract sense without thinking about its application

5. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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in particular cases. It becomes a practically inoperable rule that
trial judges and trial lawyers generally do not use and, of course,
that appellate courts seldom use because they only get the tip of
the iceberg of the problems that the trial judges and trial lawyers think about anyway.
The whole choice of law situation does raise for me many,
many more of what John Frank once referred to as "decision
points" in the case. Thus, they make the whole problem so complex that it is not worth the game for anybody involved in the
litigation in most instances.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: I would like to add to that. I agree
with Judge Keeton that the choice of law question is much more
a theoretical problem than a real one. I think it may cast a
shadow over attempts to do something sensible in the mass litigation that we have been talking about today. The conclusion of
the American Law Institute Reporters was that the rule of
Klaxon v. Stentor makes sense in typical litigation, but in the
special category of multiparty, multistate litigation, in which
they propose to make imaginative use of the diversity clause in
article III, section 2,6 they would have had Congress provide by
statute for independent choice by the federal court of what law
would apply, rather than being bound by the rule of Klaxon. I
think that especially since Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,8 if
you have a class action with claimant members of the class from
all over the country, one can no longer comfortably rely, as I
tried to persuade the Ninth Circuit it could rely two years ago in
the Dalkon Shield case, on the assumption that a California
court would apply California law to absolutely every issue no
matter where an injured person comes from. Phillips said the
state court cannot do that and, therefore, a federal court would
have to say, "Well, constitutionally, the state court cannot do
that," and that might persuade a federal court. This, however, is
simply too complex. We are going to have to apply fifty different
sets of substantive rules. I really think that legislative change is
necessary, and everyone agrees that Congress has the power to
change the rule of Klaxon.
I also think that, at least in these mass litigations, if we are

6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
7. See ALI STUDY, supra note 2, § 2374(c), at 73, 402-04.
8. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss3/11

4

1987]

et al.: Panel
Discussion
II, 38 S. C. II
L. Rev. 551 (1987).
PANEL
DISCUSSION

555

going to do anything sensible here, we need Congress to amend
the Anti-Injunction Act.9 A couple of years ago, the Eighth Circuit held, in a divided opinion, that it was wrong for the district
court judge to certify a mandatory class action in a suit for punitive damages in claims arising out of the collapse of the skywalk
of the Hyatt Regency Hotel.10 The basis for the decision was
that because certifying the class action amounts to an injunction
against state proceedings, the Anti-Injunction Act bars that. I do
not think that is an inevitable result by any means, but it is the
only appellate decision on point.
All of the Corrugated Container cases were transferred by
the multidistrict panel to Judge Singleton in Houston for pretrial and then back for settlement. Plaintiffs, both in South Carolina and in California, tried to bring their own actions rather
than be caught up in the mass action that was going on in
Texas. The Fifth Circuit held that Judge Singleton could properly enjoin prosecution of the action in South Carolina. 1 The
Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result on the same factual
setting and held that a federal district court in the Ninth Circuit
was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act from enjoining independent state court action that should have been in the action in
Houston.12 These are the kinds of things that make me think
that, as Professor Meador says, a lot can be done by the courts
themselves. However, we are going to need statutes, even on the
procedural side. I think Judge Motley quite appropriately emphasizes that the real solution for many of these things will
come from changes in substantive law.'
JUDGE KEETON: May I follow that with this question: If
we open our minds to legislation on this subject, what policy arguments for the legislation can we marshal for having a national
choice of law rule that would not also argue for having a national
substantive law rule? Once we start thinking about that, I think
we would come to the conclusion that the better legislation

9. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
10. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988
(1982). On remand a voluntary class action was certified under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
11. Three J. Farms, Inc. v. Plaintiff's Steering Comm., 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 936 (1982).
12. Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Esprit de Corp., 682 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982).
13. See Motley, supra p. 545.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

5

LAW REVIEW
CAROLINA
SOUTH
South
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2020], Art.[Vol.
11

38

would not be just a national choice of law rule, but whatever
pressures are sufficient to make that worth thinking about seriously probably also are sufficient to overcome the interests in
local autonomy with respect to the substantive rule.
PROFESSOR WECHSLER: On the point of attempting to
interest Congress in a statute which would authorize the federal
courts to make their own choice of law rules, one bit of experience may be relevant. After the ALI Study of diversity jurisdiction to which Professor Wright referred was produced, Senator
Burdick of North Dakota, a member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, developed a strong interest in the whole subject.
Under his aegis a bill was drafted that really undertook to incorporate as much of the conclusions of the ALI Study as Senator
Burdick was willing to sponsor. He went along with ninety percent or more of the ALI recommendations, but when it came to
working to preserve a piece of diversity jurisdiction for multiparty cases-as I recall, this was a requirement that no state
court would be competent to render full justice-Senator Burdick balked. The theory behind this requirement was that full
justice could not be served by state courts. Senator Burdick took
one look at that and thought that the burden of having to explain that provision in the committee, apart from having to explain it on the Senate floor, was such that it rather impaired any
prospect that the whole piece of legislation might have had. I
think, therefore, that much of these problems are legislative
problems. A great tragedy of our present situation is that we
have no adequate national organ for making national law to
solve these national problems. I think you have to keep in mind
that Congress is not going to salivate to attempt to understand
the problem, no less to resolve it. So the question really is
whether the judicially determined position in Klaxon will be reconsidered by the Court. Every effort to obtain reconsideration
is failing, however. I do not mean to be simply a voice of gloom
on these matters, but I think the prospect of Supreme Court reconsideration is very slim, and the prospect of legislative solution slimmer.
This gives force to Judge Keeton's suggestion that one is
driven to the conclusion that if this problem is to be dealt with,
it should be dealt with within the context of the substantive law
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that will govern the resolution of the action. 14 While I do not see
great enthusiasm in Congress for a national products liability
statute, for example, strong as the argument for utilizing congressional power to provide uniform rules within that area may
be, if constructive work is to be done to try to produce this solution, it seems to me that the larger issue is whether there ought
to be a national rule of liability.
I would say only one other word about the subject of mass
litigation. I am not prepared to accept the proposition that the
prospect of mass and repetitive litigation alone justifies a federal
forum. Dean Cooper raised that question. 5 I do not know if he
expressed his own view on that subject, but it seems to me that
so long as a state forum is available, and recent decisions indicate that it is if only state law is involved, it seems to me that
the case for leaving that matter to the state court is as strong as
it is in the simple diversity case. This I think is the clearest and
most obvious step that can be taken to produce elbow room,
very substantial elbow room, in both the district courts and the
circuit courts.
I am devoted to John Frank of Phoenix. I regard him as one
of my closest friends. I think that I gave him the first job that he
had in law after he graduated from the University of Wisconsin.
Nevertheless, I consider him practically Public Enemy Number
One because it was he who, almost single-handedly after the
House passed the diversity of citizenship bill in 1978, prevented
that bill from being considered in the United States Senate. It
was one of the most remarkable pieces of lobbying that I know
of, and all for a dreadful cause.
DEAN GRISWOLD: I have a technical and law school type
of question to ask Professor Weschler, or anyone else, in connection with his recent remark. Why is Phillips Petroleum not inconsistent with Klaxon? It may be that the due process clause,
because it is applicable to the federal courts, requires that the
federal courts use an appropriate standard in choice of law;
therefore the due process clause requires that Kansas cannot apply its law to all these states. We have been looking for an answer to Klaxon for forty years. I wonder if it is not right under
our noses.
14. See Keeton, supra pp. 555-56.
15. See Cooper, supra pp. 496-99.
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PROFESSOR WECHSLER: Well, I think that is an interesting proposition. I do not react adversely to your view at the
moment. Do you?
PROFESSOR BATOR: No, I do not.
JUDGE KEETON: Well, is not Phillips Petroleum only a
slight qualification rather than a displacement of the Klaxon
rule? The due process standard is a constitutional standard that
would only cut a little way into the Klaxon rule. It would give
the courts another decision point to use in trying to figure out
when Klaxon does and does not apply.
PROFESSOR BATOR: Maybe the answer is this: In principle the Klaxon rule was always limited by the fact that it is only
constitutional state choice of law rules that the federal courts
under Klaxon have to adopt. Insofar as these constitutional due
process constraints on the states expand and limit the state's
power to decide what the choice of law should be, there is a dissolving of the Klaxon rule. The greater the extent of the due
process constraint, the less bite Klaxon has as an independent
principle.
DEAN GRISWOLD: I have a broader philosophical or
moral question that I cannot possibly answer myself: Is not part
of the problem in mass tort litigation that we have gone too far
in expanding and developing tort law? After all, virtually all
products liability law is court created. We have developed the
idea, which seems to permeate everything, that anybody who has
suffered a loss for any purpose ought to be paid for it. It really is
considerably inconsistent with any general, old-fashioned,
Judeo-Christian notions of individual responsibility and of the
importance of people taking care of themselves. I think particularly in this respect of the asbestos litigation, in which, to the
best of my knowledge, my firm does not have any connection
with any asbestos case and, therefore, I have just an academic
bias. Here is a situation in which a lot of businessmen provided
something that everybody wanted. I am not now thinking about
the mine workers who, of course, are entitled to workers' compensation. The idea that because asbestos was put around the
pipes in my heating system and thirty years later, without any
foreknowledge on the part of anyone at Johns Manville or whoever provided the asbestos, asbestosis develops, that Johns
Manville or whoever should have to pay for it seems to me to be:
(a) completely a court creation and (b) one remedy that ought to
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be reconsidered. If we did not reach out and feel that everyone
who suffered a loss anywhere ought to be paid for it, we could
eliminate a lot of these mass tort problems. This would also apply to a considerable extent in the Dalkon Shield area. So, this
really seems to me to be a court-created problem, and maybe it
is time the courts began to think a little about it and qualify it.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: I see people both in the audience
and on the platform who would like to respond to Dean Griswold, but I think that the schedule says we must move onto another subject. In fact, if we are going to get into whether section
402A of the Restatement of Torts was or was not a wise piece of
legislation for the ALI to adopt, I know I will not get back to
Houston in time for the World Series. So I am going to have to
cut off that topic and turn to the ...
DEAN GRISWOLD: You get down to the fundamental
question and then you will not talk about it.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: No, I think there is so much to be
said about that, Dean Griswold, that it will have to be the topic
for next year's seminar at the University of South Carolina
School of Law.
END OF PANEL DISCUSSION
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